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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE 
OF THE CASE 
The respondent did not pay income taxes for 1968, 
1969 and 1970 and was assessed and judgment rendered. 
The respondent's employer was garnished, an Answer filed, 
and the appellant moved the lower court for a Garnishee 
Judgment of 50 percent of the net disposable earnings. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court denied appellant's motion for judg-
ment of 50 percent of the net disposable earnings and indi-
cated that 25 percent was the proper amount in the Court's 
opinion. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The lower court's Order should be reversed, and the 
matter remanded with instructions as to this Court's inter-
pretation of the applicable Federal law, which exempts this 
appellant from any percentage limitations on its garnishments 
of wages due. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
There is no question that the defendant, Dana A. 
Meier, owes state taxes. The question before the Court is 
simply a matter of law and not of fact. There is no dis-
pute as to the sums or amounts garnished. 
The appellant, Utah State Tax Commission, pursuing 
its normal collection procedures, after the tax judgment 
had been rendered in the Third Judicial District Court, the Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
State Tax Commission of Utah garnished the defendant's 
employer, Butler Buildings, garnishee, who answered 
that he was indebted to the defendant at the time of 
service of the garnishment for three days' salary, or 
in the amount of $181.83. Based on that answer, the 
appellant applied to the lower court for a Garnishee 
Judgment and Execution, filed and argued a motion to 
the Court for judgment against the garnishee in the 
amount of 50 percent of the answer. That motion was de-
nied by the Minute Entry, Dated August 29, 1975. It is 
that final Order that is appealed. 
POINT I 
•••'~. GARNISHEE JUDGMENTS FOR THE COLLECTION 
OF UTAH STATE TAX REVENUES ARE STATU-
TORILY EXEMPT FROM ANY PERCENTAGE LIMIT-
ATIONS. 
Congress, pursuant to its power to regulate commerc 
and to establish uniform laws, enacted the Consumer Credit 
Protection Act. A portion of the Consumer Credit Protec-
tion Act, 15 USC, 1671 through 1577, protects the credit 
consumer and makes the law uniform by establishing ceiling 
on garnishment amounts. These limits were established for 
a purpose. That purpose and intent of Congress are clear! 
set out in the statute itself: 
"(1) The unrestricted garnishment 
of compensation due for personal services 
encourages the making of predatory exten-
sions of credit. Such extensions of credit 
divert money into excessive credit payments 
and thereby hinder the production and flow of 
goods in interstate commerce. 
' • - 2 -
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(2) The application of garnishment 
as a creditors' remedy frequently results 
in loss of employment by the debtor, and 
the resulting disruption of employment, 
production, and consumption constitutes a 
substantial burden on interstate commerce. 
(3) The great disparities among the 
laws of the several States, relating to 
garnishment have, in effect, destroyed the 
uniformity of the bankruptcy laws and frus-
trated the purposes thereof in many areas 
of the country." 
16 USC, 1671 (a) 
(Emphasis added.) 
The specific restriction establishes a ceiling on the amount 
of consumer credit earnings subject to garnishment and 
reads , as follows : 
(b) 
"(a) Except 
and in 
as provided in subsection 
section 305 /^Section 1675 of this 
title/, the maximum part of the aggregate dis-
posable earnings of an individual for any 
workweek which is subject to garnishment may 
not exceed 
(1) 25 per centum of his disposable 
earnings for that week, or 
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Subsection (b) of Title 15 USC, 1673, sets forth 
three specific exemptions to the garnishment ceilings 
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established in subsection (a): 
"(b) The restrictions of subsection (a) 
do not apply in the case of 
(1) any order of any court for the 
support of any person. 
(2) any order of any court of bank-
ruptcy under chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy 
Act £11 Sections 1001-1086/. 
(3) any debt due for any State or 
Federal tax." 
15 USC, 1673 .(b) 
(Emphasis added.) 
The appellant not only submits that the State Tax 
Commission is specifically exempt from limitations on its 
collection garnishments by virtue of specific Federal mand 
but also contends that the State and Federal statutes are 
Consumer Credit Protection Acts passed with the specific 
intent of protecting the credit consumer in the state and 
in the nation and to apply those acts to a state revenue 
situation is not consistent with the intent of the Federal 
Congress or the State Legislature. It should be obvious 
to all persons that state taxes must be paid in order to 
sustain the viability of the government, and, therefore, 
the specific exemptions granted by the Federal Congress or 
the implied exemptions granted by the Utah State Legisla-
ture must be applied. 
It should also be pointed out that tax judgments 
are not dischargeable in bankruptcy proceedings. Therefor 
to grant an exception to the percentage limitations to the 
Utah State Tax Commission would not be inconsistent with 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the intent of the Federal Congress that uniformity in 
the bankruptcy laws not be frustrated. 
In
 Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 US 651 , 94 S.Ct. 2431, 
L.Ed 2d (1974), the Court denied a debtor's claim that 
Title 15 USC, Section 1673, precluded a trustee in bank-
ruptcy from attaching his income tax refund. The Court 
outlined the relationship of the Consumer Credit Protec-
tion Act and other Federal legislation. The Supreme Court 
determined that the Act did not alter or interfere with 
the provisions of the Federal Bankruptcy Act. 
"The Congress did not enact the Consumer 
Credit Protection Act in a vacuum. The 
drafters of the statute were well aware that 
the provisions and the purposes of the Bank-
ruptcy Act and the new legislation would have 
to coexist." 
94 S.Ct. at 2436 
The Court then went on to say that when interpreting the 
statute, it will not look solely to one general clause but 
to the entire Act and its purpose. Therefore, the Supreme 
Court's analysis of the Bankruptcy Act must be applicable 
to the other exempted areas set forth in Section 1673 (b).
 v 
The rationale of Kokozka, supra, supports the view that 
the State of Utah's Consumer Credit Protection Act does not 
supersede the present "state" tax, support, and bankruptcy 
exemptions, and the procedures implemented to enforce them. 
Indeed, the tax obligation is a debt owed the state 
and does not result at all from a predatory extension of 
credit which was the evil that Congress sought to eliminate. 
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POINT II 
THE SUPREMACY DOCTRINE REQUIRES THAT STATE 
GARNISHMENT LAWS COMPLY WITH THE ENTIRE 
FEDERAL STATUTE ON GARNISHMENTS CONTAINED 
IN THE CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION ACT, 15 
USC, 1673. 
Subsection (c) of Title 15 USC, 1673, prohibits 
any court of the United States or any state to issue a 
garnishment order contrary to the provisions of Title 
15 USC 5 Section 1673: 
"(c) No court of the United States or 
any State may make, execute or enforce 
any order or process in violation of this 
section." 
(Emphasis added.) 
It goes without saying that, if a state district 
court is to forbid making, executing, or enforcing a per-
centage of garnishments, the Court would be incorrectly 
interpreting the above-quoted statutes and disallowing their 
uniform application. 
The constitutional mandate of supremacy as applied 
to the legislative actions of Congress in the commerce and 
bankruptcy areas precludes conflicting or contrary state 
legislation or judicial action. Article VI of the United 
States Constitution. The supremacy doctrine is reinforced 
in the garnishment context by specific congressional lang-
uage in the statute itself. It would, therefore, be con-
trary to the express intent of 15 USC, Section 1673, to 
fail to issue a Garnishee Judgment in the proper percentage 
of "net disposable earnings." The supremacy doctrine, there 
fore, must preclude states from enacting legislation or 
- A . 
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judicial action which permits garnishments in excess 
of the ceiling established in subsection (a) and also 
prohibits a state from emaculating the effect of the 
statutory exceptions set forth in subsection ( b ) . To 
do otherwise would not only make the statute null but 
also render it useless in its intent for national uni-
formity in application. Any state action which estab-
lishes an across-the-board upper limit on garnishments 
without regard for the Federal exceptions provided in 
subsection (b) would be contrary to the doctrine of 
supremacy and uniformity and, therefore, should have no 
effect on garnishment procedures in those exempted areas. 
"The secretary of Labor may by 
regulation exempt from the provisions 
of section 303 (a) /^Section 1673 (a) of 
this title/ garnishments issued under the 
laws of the state if he determines that the 
laws of that state provide restrictions on 
garnishments which are substantially similar 
to those provided in section 303 (a) 
^/Section 1673 (a) of this title/." 
15 USC 1675 
(Emphasis added. ) 
The above section indicates that Congress considered the 
question of exemptions to the statute and specifically mad 
three exceptions but granted no such discretion to the 
states to regulate those exemptions. 
Appellant recognizes that Section 1677 may be mis-
takenly construed to allow states to establish an upper 
limit on all garnishments disregarding the exemption pro-
visions contained in Section 1673 (b). Section 1677 reads 
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"This title does not annul, alter, or 
affect, or exempt any person from comply-
ing with, the laws of any state 
' V-.-..•• (1 ).'.•• prohibiting garnishments or provid-
ing for more limited garnishments 
than are allowed under this title 
..:;,-•.;;••..' -VSections 1671-1677 of this title/, 
or 
(2) Prohibiting the discharge of any 
employee by reason of the fact that 
his earnings have been subjected to 
garnishment for more than one indebted-
ness ." 
15 USC, 1677 
There is no power or discretion granted, however, to 
modify the Federal statute by changing the parties that 
are exempt from its application. The Congress must have 
intended to grant discretion only in the areas of garnish-
ments other than those granted specific exemptions; i.e., 
support, bankruptcy and taxes. This is also consistent with 
their stated intent to regulate only consumer credit trans-
actions . 
Therefore, Section 1675 allows the Secretary of 
Labor to grant exemptions to the provisions of "Section 
1673 (a)" only. The exemptions of Section 1673 (b) must 
still be in effect and be controlling on the states by the 
preemption language of Section 1673 ( c ) . (Note: This 
statute uses the word "section" rather than the wording 
"subchapter.") 
The appellant's view was set forth in the case of 
Hodgson v. Cleveland Municipal Court, 326 F.Supp. 419 
-8-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(D.C.N.D. Ohio 1971). In holding, the Federal statute 
is supreme- The Court said: 
"The restrictions of section 1673 (a) 
are subject to two exceptions that do not 
detract from the generally mandatory nature 
of section 1673 (a). Section 1673 (b) makes 
the restrictions of subsection (a) inapplic-
able to court support orders, bankruptcy 
court orders under Chapter XIII of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, or to any debt due for any state 
or federal tax. Section 1673, previously re-
cited, authorizes the Secretary to exempt 
state garnishment laws from the restrictions 
of section 1673 ( a ) . n 
326 F.Supp. at 430 
(Emphasis added.) 
"Once having forbidden the validity of 
any state court 'order or process' that 
violates section 1673 ( a ) , it is unlikely 
that Congress in a later provision of the 
same law would recant that prohibition. In 
any event, the general language of section 
1677, previously quoted, shows no congressional 
intention to abrogate or weaken the specific 
Federal preemption ordered by Congress in sec-
tion 1673 (cTT^ 
326 F.Supp. at 432 
(Emphasis added.) 
The exceptions to subsection (a) provided in sub 
section (b) are, therefore, made controlling on the st 
by the clear supremacy language of subsection (c) and 
the United States Constitution. 
POINT III 
THE UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE MUST HAVE INTENDED 
TO GRANT THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION AN 
EXEMPTION FROM ANY CEILING LIMITATIONS UPON 
GARNISHMENTS FOR THE COLLECTION OF STATE 
REVENUES. 
The Utah State Legislature being aware of state 
collection procedures and problems passed the Individu 
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Income Tax Act of 1973 and provided in Section 95 
of that Act that the Utah State Tax Commission shall 
have the power to administer and enforce all taxes due, 
pursuant to the Income Tax Act. It also reiterated in 
Section 79 of that Act that the taxes imposed by the 
Act shall be collected by the Utah State Tax Commission 
giving it authority to establish the mode or time for 
collection of any amount determined to be due under the 
Act. The legislative intent to grant to the Tax Commis-
sion the necessary power and authority to collect taxes 
due for the full amount within sixty days was restated 
in the following quote: 
"(d) Any sheriff who receives a warrant 
under subsection (c) of this section shall 
within five days thereafter file the dupli-
cate copy with the clerk of the district 
court of the appropriate county- The clerk 
of such court shall thereupon enter in the 
judgment docket, in the column for judgment 
debtors, the name of the taxpayer mentioned 
in the warrant, and, in appropriate columns, 
the tax or other amounts for which the war-
rant is issued and the date when such copy is 
filed; and such amount shall thereupon be a 
binding lien upon the real, personal and other 
property of the taxpayer to the same extent as 
other judgments duly docketed in the office of 
such clerk. 
,f(e) When a warrant has been filed with the 
county clerk, the tax commission shall, in the 
right of the people of the State of Utah, be 
deemed to have obtained judgment against the 
taxpayer for the tax or other amounts." 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-14A-79 (d)(e), 
as amended , (1973). 
(Emphasis added.) 
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The income tax statutes, prior to the 1973 Act, 
were upheld as being constitutional by this Court in 
the case of Utah State Tax Commission v. Hoopes, 30 Utah 
2d 107, 109 (1973) (Footnote 7 ) ; 514 P.2d 221 (1973). 
Therefore, it would seem to be illogical for the Utah 
State Legislature and this Court to grant the Utah State 
Tax Commission power and authority to collect state reven-
ues by means of a docket judgment having the force and 
effect of execution upon the personal property of the tax-
payer without expecting the Tax Commission to be able to 
effectively collect that judgment by garnishment upon the 
entire personal earnings of the party in paying his taxes. 
It should be noted that the Utah Uniform Consumer Credit 
Code was passed by the State Legislature in 1969 previous 
to the enactment of the above-quoted statute but not men-
tioned anywhere in that statute. There were no percentage 
limitations imposed by the Legislature in the above-quoted 
statute, and none were intended since the only other applic-
able provision would be the garnishment provisions set 
forth in the Utah Consumer Credit Act, and the Legislature 
must have clearly understood that a collection of state 
revenues is not "predatory extension of credit." 
Although taxes are possibly high . and burdensome 
to all of us, we are all aware that they are necessary for 
the proper function of government. It would be inequitable 
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to allow the party, not promptly paying his taxes, to 
have a 25 percent exemption from payment of that tax 
judgment, when the balance of the citizens of the State 
of Utah is complying with the voluntary payment provi-
sions of the Legislature's mandate. The Utah State Tax 
Commission reports for the taxable year 1974 an excess 
of 10,000 "tax warrant judgments" docketed throughout the 
State of Utah. To impose a limitation upon the ever-
increasing collection burden would materially affect the 
collection of state revenues and the effective and effi-
cient operation of the government of the State of Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
•'- ' The garnishment provisions of Rule 64D of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Uniform Consumer Credit 
Code can only be effective so far as they comply with the 
applicable provisions of the CCPA, as the Federal Act is 
supreme. Congress preempted state garnishment laws regard-
ing the ceilings on consumer credit garnishments and also 
the exceptions to the ceiling limitations. The Utah rule 
regarding garnishments, Rule 64D of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, is well within the ceiling requirements of 15 
USC 1673 (a). In spite of the absence of the exceptions 
set forth in 15 USC, 1673 (b) in the Utah Rules, 15 USC, 
1673 ( c ) , makes such exceptions for taxes a mandatory 
part of state revenue garnishment collection procedures. 
Appellant, therefore, submits that the amount of disposable 
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earnings which becomes subject to garnishment for state 
revenues and support is excepted from the percentage 
provisions of Rule 64D, URCP, and the Uniform Consumer 
Credit Code by virtue of Federal law and the United 
States Constitution. 
Section 70B-5-105, Utah Code Annotated, ( 1 9 5 3 ) , 
being a Uniform Consumer Credit Code, would not be ap-
plicable to tax payments due as any taxes would be a 
nonconsumer, noncredit transaction. It was not the in-
tent of the State Legislature to regulate tax revenues 
by this statute. It is also obvious that the state Act 
is superseded by the supremacy language of Section 1673 
(c) of the Federal Act. 
Therefore, the appellant submits that the Third 
Judicial District Court was in error in refusing to gra 
a Garnishee Judgment for at least 50 percent of t h e . 
amounts garnished and due for the payment of state taxe 
The Order should be reversed and remanded with appropri 
instructions. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
BRUCE M. HALE 
Assistant Attorney General 
BRINTON R. BURBIDGE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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